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Post by the light works on Nov 9, 2020 17:43:55 GMT
according to Wikipedia, the UK also had 7. it appears from a quick read that carrier doctrine was still in flux in the 40s. there had clearly been successful uses of carrier based planes in long range attack roles, but it appears the "old guard" still considered carriers as a combination of defensive air support, and something that would lose against a ship with big guns. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_aircraft_carrierI would hazard a guess that most senior strategists, being senior, still thought of airplanes as a way to better direct the REAL weapons; and hadn't started thinking of the airplanes as the weapons, themselves. it's a good illustration of why the advantage and disadvantage of having your oldest, most experienced men be your strategy bosses are the same. "we've always done it this way" works right up until it doesn't. And, so, we've both managed to identify 14 carriers right there. That's a lot of aircraft for a battleship-only culture (overstated that a bit, but you get it) America dive bomber first flown in 1940: en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_SBD_DauntlessSeems aircraft could be made to do the job of big guns, whether arny artillery or naval ship guns. I'm not saying either of you is wrong, but I'm not totally willing to dismiss naval commanders during that time as being out of touch, completely. At least not so far as to be unable to appreciate intelligence. the UK was building their carriers to protect their convoys from attack by german warships or U-boats. in fact, some of their carriers were cargo ships that carried torpedo bombers. also, in point of fact, the SBD was officially, "Scout Bomber, Douglas" and it's first action was having most of a wing of them destroyed on the ground at Pearl Harbor, while a few, that happened to be in the right place at the right time, were able to impede the Japanese attack. (by which I mean they were flying in to the base at the right time to get involved) later, they were used effectively in an attack capacity. I'm still of the opinion that the strategy folks weren't yet in a mindset of "aircraft carrier = mobile airbase useful for long range strikes" at that point - much like our tank strategists weren't yet in a mindset of "we'll send our tanks out to duel with their tanks and our infantry will support them" we were still in the WWII mindset of "bombard the enemy and then send in the infantry to win the war" at that point.
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Post by rmc on Nov 9, 2020 18:01:25 GMT
Alright. I'll ask to have this topic and thread deleted. No point cluttering up our board with what will, no doubt be argued as conspiracy trash. Since it is available world-wide, I wouldn't want this site associated with that.
I know there is no way to prove my concern.
It's funny. Physics is entering, or has entered a chapter where using Einstein's thought experiments are just about all we have left. Doing experiments that are able to prove what's inside a singularity, or what's happening deep inside loop gravity & a pixelated time and space universe are essentially out of reach.
Sometimes all you have left is reasoning and carefully thought out logic. This topic is relegated to the same problem.
The ancient Greeks would be so pleased.
Perhaps they, or Hercule Poirot will crack this case, if there is or ever was one.
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Post by the light works on Nov 9, 2020 18:11:53 GMT
Alright. I'll ask to have this topic and thread deleted. No point cluttering up our board with what will, no doubt be argued as conspiracy trash. Since it is available world-wide, I wouldn't want this site associated with that. I know there is no way to prove my concern. It's funny. Physics is entering, or has entered a chapter where using Einstein's thought experiments are just about all we have left. Doing experiments that are able to prove what's inside a singularity, or what's happening deep inside loop gravity & a pixelated time and space universe are essentially out of reach. Sometimes all you have left is reasoning and carefully thought out logic. This topic is relegated to the same problem. The ancient Greeks would be so pleased. Perhaps they, or Hercule Poirot will crack this case, if there is or ever was one. I think keep it as a platform for exploring WWII era strategic thinking. the theory in itself is not particularly controversial. there is even a possibility that they anticipated the japanese would do SOMETHING if they poked them enough - so I don't see a reason not to leave the thread.
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Post by rmc on Nov 9, 2020 19:11:04 GMT
"Denied intelligence"
Also, look close at 4:30 on...
And, it appears now President Biden could be asked to become involved and correct much of this.
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Post by the light works on Nov 10, 2020 14:59:45 GMT
"Denied intelligence" Also, look close at 4:30 on... And, it appears now President Biden could be asked to become involved and correct much of this. the context of the scapegoating in my way of thinking, implies more a degree of guilt and coverup for negligence rather than a degree of guilt and coverup for culpability. I would expect covering up culpability would involve scapegoating people in intelligence rather than people at pearl harbor. I could be wrong in this, of course - all we can do is speculate, and my speculation is based on the thought that if they had deliberately allowed the attack to be a surprise, they would not want people to know they could have figured it out.
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Post by wvengineer on Nov 10, 2020 15:18:49 GMT
I would offer one view that more evidence in it not being intentional is the fact that the Navy didn't use it to their advantage.
If they did know Japan was planning to strike Hawaii, they would know certain information about the fleet. The carriers bing used, what the fleet looked like, and most importantly, roughly where it will be and when.
If the goal is to let Japan attack to pull the US out of it's isolationism, fine, but then you will have the population of the US thirsty for blood. Once the order is given to go to war with Japan, the NAVY now knows roughly where a large part of the enemy fleet is. It also knows that it is at it's maximum limits for logistics. While it may now know the exact location, you have enough of an idea to launch a search. Once the fleet is located, the assets that are at sea can engage and attack. This could result in a serious blow to Japan before they really have a chance to get their war machine turned to fight the US.
Think about it this way, if the US had known the IJN fleet was coming, we would have seen the equivalent to the Battle of Midway in early December 1941 instead of 8 months later in July 1942.
Japan would likely have been a lot more cautious to their approach to expansion in the Pacific. On the flip side, that may tip them off that the US knew how to read their code system. They could re-engineer their communication and encryption processes and the US could loose the advantages they had with Project Magic.
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Post by the light works on Nov 10, 2020 15:49:47 GMT
I would offer one view that more evidence in it not being intentional is the fact that the Navy didn't use it to their advantage. If they did know Japan was planning to strike Hawaii, they would know certain information about the fleet. The carriers bing used, what the fleet looked like, and most importantly, roughly where it will be and when. If the goal is to let Japan attack to pull the US out of it's isolationism, fine, but then you will have a population in the US thirsty for blood. One the order is given to go to war with Japan, the NAVY now knows roughly where a large part of the enemy fleet is. It also knows that it is at it's maximum limits for logistics. While it may now know the exact location, you have enough of an idea to launch a search. Once the fleet is located, the assets that are at sea can engage an attack. This could result in a serious blow to Japan before they really have a chance to get their war machine turned to fight the US. Think about it this way, if the US had known the IJN fleet was coming, we would have seen the equivalent to the Battle of Midway in early December 1941 instead of 8 months later in July 1942. Japan would likely have been a lot more cautious to their approach to expansion in the Pacific. On the flip side, that may tip them off that the US knew how to read their code system. They could re-engineer their communication and encryption processes and the US could loose the advantages they had with Project Magic. it also brings up another point I make to 9/11 truthers: the pearl harbor attack didn't need to be successful to "wake the sleeping dragon" it just needed to happen.
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Post by rmc on Nov 11, 2020 12:54:14 GMT
I would offer one view that more evidence in it not being intentional is the fact that the Navy didn't use it to their advantage. If they did know Japan was planning to strike Hawaii, they would know certain information about the fleet. The carriers bing used, what the fleet looked like, and most importantly, roughly where it will be and when. If the goal is to let Japan attack to pull the US out of it's isolationism, fine, but then you will have the population of the US thirsty for blood. Once the order is given to go to war with Japan, the NAVY now knows roughly where a large part of the enemy fleet is. It also knows that it is at it's maximum limits for logistics. While it may now know the exact location, you have enough of an idea to launch a search. Once the fleet is located, the assets that are at sea can engage and attack. This could result in a serious blow to Japan before they really have a chance to get their war machine turned to fight the US. Think about it this way, if the US had known the IJN fleet was coming, we would have seen the equivalent to the Battle of Midway in early December 1941 instead of 8 months later in July 1942. Japan would likely have been a lot more cautious to their approach to expansion in the Pacific. On the flip side, that may tip them off that the US knew how to read their code system. They could re-engineer their communication and encryption processes and the US could loose the advantages they had with Project Magic. Ironically, when the entire juggernaut of the U.S. military gets underway, and not just a few rogue leaders, there is great concern that numbers of casualties remain within certain acceptable guidelines and that the mission equipment overwhelms the enemy, as I'm sure you know. It's not like jumping into a ready made patrol car, and speeding after the bandits when a call comes in that there's been a heist or something. Mission planners have to access the situation, train and rehearse for viable missions, bring in or make from scratch appropriate weapons and tools. The Japanese fleet would be onto another mission by then. Or, more importantly, enough U.S. personnel would be up to something that the Japanese could see. As it was, the fleet was quietly parked at Pearl, and all was uneventful. Going right out after the Imperial Japanese warships when the main body of the services were unprepared wouldn't have acceptable results, once those results came in... or at least that's what the concern was, most likely. To specifically address your concern, though: Any rogue leaders willing to "deny intelligence" would be unable to orchestrate the kind of full scale Naval preparedness necessary to immediately take on the well-equipped Japanese navy without raising some obvious and significant questions. Or risk alerting the Japanese that we were ready for them if we did anything other than remain still. And, so the Japanese attack could be recognized, and then allowed to happen at "best"... without looking like it was all preconceived, or effecting Japan's decision to attack. Needing a serious upgrade first, before going on any full scale counterattacks was a known problem. But, couldn't do anything like that properly without a lot of public support. (Which we got... later... due to what utterly looked like, and continues to look like, a genuine "Surprise" attack. Totally suckerpunched... nothing less) As quickly as possible, an air attack, (Dolittle Raid, some five months after initial attack) comprised of key volunteers was done relatively immediately after so as to give the public some sense we were doing something that wouldn't involve such huge numbers of sailors or troops in theater so as to have unacceptable casualties (and, would continue to keep U.S. planning invisible). And, then, as you say Midway took place just as "soon" as the entire navy was ready... properly, for the situation.
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Post by the light works on Nov 11, 2020 15:16:01 GMT
I would offer one view that more evidence in it not being intentional is the fact that the Navy didn't use it to their advantage. If they did know Japan was planning to strike Hawaii, they would know certain information about the fleet. The carriers bing used, what the fleet looked like, and most importantly, roughly where it will be and when. If the goal is to let Japan attack to pull the US out of it's isolationism, fine, but then you will have the population of the US thirsty for blood. Once the order is given to go to war with Japan, the NAVY now knows roughly where a large part of the enemy fleet is. It also knows that it is at it's maximum limits for logistics. While it may now know the exact location, you have enough of an idea to launch a search. Once the fleet is located, the assets that are at sea can engage and attack. This could result in a serious blow to Japan before they really have a chance to get their war machine turned to fight the US. Think about it this way, if the US had known the IJN fleet was coming, we would have seen the equivalent to the Battle of Midway in early December 1941 instead of 8 months later in July 1942. Japan would likely have been a lot more cautious to their approach to expansion in the Pacific. On the flip side, that may tip them off that the US knew how to read their code system. They could re-engineer their communication and encryption processes and the US could loose the advantages they had with Project Magic. Ironically, when the entire juggernaut of the U.S. military gets underway, and not just a few rogue leaders, there is great concern that numbers of casualties remain within certain acceptable guidelines and that the mission equipment overwhelms the enemy, as I'm sure you know. It's not like jumping into a ready made patrol car, and speeding after the bandits when a call comes in that there's been a heist or something. Mission planners have to access the situation, train and rehearse for viable missions, bring in or make from scratch appropriate weapons and tools. The Japanese fleet would be onto another mission by then. Or, more importantly, enough U.S. personnel would be up to something that the Japanese could see. As it was, the fleet was quietly parked at Pearl, and all was uneventful. Going right out after the Imperial Japanese warships when the main body of the services were unprepared wouldn't have acceptable results, once those results came in... or at least that's what the concern was, most likely. To specifically address your concern, though: Any rogue leaders willing to "deny intelligence" would be unable to orchestrate the kind of full scale Naval preparedness necessary to immediately take on the well-equipped Japanese navy without raising some obvious and significant questions. Or risk alerting the Japanese that we were ready for them if we did anything other than remain still. And, so the Japanese attack could be recognized, and then allowed to happen at "best"... without looking like it was all preconceived, or effecting Japan's decision to attack. Needing a serious upgrade first, before going on any full scale counterattacks was a known problem. But, couldn't do anything like that properly without a lot of public support. (Which we got... later... due to what utterly looked like, and continues to look like, a genuine "Surprise" attack. Totally suckerpunched... nothing less) As quickly as possible, an air attack, (Dolittle Raid, some five months after initial attack) comprised of key volunteers was done relatively immediately after so as to give the public some sense we were doing something that wouldn't involve such huge numbers of sailors or troops in theater so as to have unacceptable casualties (and, would continue to keep U.S. planning invisible). And, then, as you say Midway took place just as "soon" as the entire navy was ready... properly, for the situation. what WV is saying is if we'd been paying attention to the intelligence, we could have set a trap; and we didn't.
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Post by rmc on Nov 11, 2020 15:29:00 GMT
Ironically, when the entire juggernaut of the U.S. military gets underway, and not just a few rogue leaders, there is great concern that numbers of casualties remain within certain acceptable guidelines and that the mission equipment overwhelms the enemy, as I'm sure you know. It's not like jumping into a ready made patrol car, and speeding after the bandits when a call comes in that there's been a heist or something. Mission planners have to access the situation, train and rehearse for viable missions, bring in or make from scratch appropriate weapons and tools. The Japanese fleet would be onto another mission by then. Or, more importantly, enough U.S. personnel would be up to something that the Japanese could see. As it was, the fleet was quietly parked at Pearl, and all was uneventful. Going right out after the Imperial Japanese warships when the main body of the services were unprepared wouldn't have acceptable results, once those results came in... or at least that's what the concern was, most likely. To specifically address your concern, though: Any rogue leaders willing to "deny intelligence" would be unable to orchestrate the kind of full scale Naval preparedness necessary to immediately take on the well-equipped Japanese navy without raising some obvious and significant questions. Or risk alerting the Japanese that we were ready for them if we did anything other than remain still. And, so the Japanese attack could be recognized, and then allowed to happen at "best"... without looking like it was all preconceived, or effecting Japan's decision to attack. Needing a serious upgrade first, before going on any full scale counterattacks was a known problem. But, couldn't do anything like that properly without a lot of public support. (Which we got... later... due to what utterly looked like, and continues to look like, a genuine "Surprise" attack. Totally suckerpunched... nothing less) As quickly as possible, an air attack, (Dolittle Raid, some five months after initial attack) comprised of key volunteers was done relatively immediately after so as to give the public some sense we were doing something that wouldn't involve such huge numbers of sailors or troops in theater so as to have unacceptable casualties (and, would continue to keep U.S. planning invisible). And, then, as you say Midway took place just as "soon" as the entire navy was ready... properly, for the situation. what WV is saying is if we'd been paying attention to the intelligence, we could have set a trap; and we didn't. And what I'm saying is a trap sprung would have made my job too easy, if you get what I mean... As it is, I find some question as to if intelligence was denied by a couple of D.C. officers. A trap being sprung would make my questions all the more poignant. It likely would be too risky as well. Possibly tipping off Japan, trying to set up such a trap. The trap would have required many details much harder to hide than merely withholding intel... Better to not fiddle about trying to setup and employ some complicated trap when simply withholding intel accomplishes the "mission" of getting us into war. And, remember, "the MISSION comes first"... not necessarily your people, sad to say. Having no evidence of a trap later (which large scale troop preparedness could provide) provides "plausible deniability" to use their own wacky terminology
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Post by the light works on Nov 11, 2020 16:15:34 GMT
what WV is saying is if we'd been paying attention to the intelligence, we could have set a trap; and we didn't. And what I'm saying is a trap sprung would have made my job too easy, if you get what I mean... As it is, I find some question as to if intelligence was denied by a couple of D.C. officers. A trap being sprung would make my questions all the more poignant. It likely would be too risky as well. Possibly tipping off Japan, trying to set up such a trap. The trap would have required many details much harder to hide than merely withholding intel... Better to not fiddle about trying to setup and employ some complicated trap when simply withholding intel accomplishes the "mission" of getting us into war. And, remember, "the MISSION comes first"... not necessarily your people, sad to say. Having no evidence of a trap later (which large scale troop preparedness could provide) provides "plausible deniability" to use their own wacky terminology simply having everybody in a state of anticipatory readiness would have saved a fortune in lives and equipment, and would not have negated the "those sneaky (racist epithet)s tried to do a sneak attack" response. and keep in mind shell games were a very large part of WWII military strategy. though sometimes more successful than others. youtuber Lindybeige has a clip in which he describes how the brits wanted to take town A, so they simulated a large buildup near town B, which instead of resulting in, I think the italians stripping town A to reinforce town B, it resulted in them evacuating town B to avoid losses - which resulted in a massive buildup in town A.
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Post by rmc on Nov 11, 2020 17:01:55 GMT
Which, again, leaves me to believe the amount of time available must have been less than necessary.
"Japanese fleet has left their ports"
Okay, that's a little alarming, but who knows where they're going. Could be Pearl, but let's wait and see so as to not change things. This might be exactly what we need to change minds around here.
Later...
"North Island, Honolulu, reports possible aircraft heading toward Pearl Harbor, Hawaii"
Tell them to go ahead and shut off the radar.
(Those are statements by two different commanders, by the way. The first thoughts or statements by a commander in Washington D.C., the latter, an uninformed commander located in Hawaii. If both thoughts had been by the same commander, located in D.C., your argument that he didn't have to take it THAT far would be spot on. Just the attack on Pearl would have been enough, as you say. But, since he started withholding info a very worse scenario happened where his subordinates unexpectedly turned off the freaking radar, apparently without his knowledge... at least I hope it was without his knowledge... unless he was vying for a new set of battleships or something)
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Post by the light works on Nov 11, 2020 20:27:48 GMT
Which, again, leaves me to believe the amount of time available must have been less than necessary. "Japanese fleet has left their ports" Okay, that's a little alarming, but who knows where they're going. Could be Pearl, but let's wait and see so as to not change things. This might be exactly what we need to change minds around here. Later... "North Island, Honolulu, reports possible aircraft heading toward Pearl Harbor, Hawaii" Tell them to go ahead and shut off the radar. (Those are statements by two different commanders, by the way. The first thoughts or statements by a commander in Washington D.C., the latter, an uninformed commander located in Hawaii. If both thoughts had been by the same commander, located in D.C., your argument that he didn't have to take it THAT far would be spot on. Just the attack on Pearl would have been enough, as you say. But, since he started withholding info a very worse scenario happened where his subordinates unexpectedly turned off the freaking radar, apparently without his knowledge... at least I hope it was without his knowledge... unless he was vying for a new set of battleships or something) to be sure I'm understanding clearly, it is the ones in quotes that are actual statements? statement one, my reaction as a naval commander would be "okay, let's keep an eye on them" statement two would be "let's delay shutting down the radar until we know what's up" but then, I also have the benefit of hindsight. and I don't know whether it is here or elsewhere I pointed out that the US has a habit of being hyperattentive at first and then becoming complacent over time until something goes pear shaped.
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Post by mrfatso on Nov 12, 2020 0:33:04 GMT
There was no reason to think the IJN was going to attack Pearl when it left port, it could have been manoeuvres, they could have been going elsewhere like Vladivostok 941km from Japan with a hard pressed USSR looking like it might fall to Germany, or Hong Kong that the British would have difficulty defending. And how many times had they left port for manoeuvres, did America jump every time that happened.
The radar was due to be switched off I would guess for maintenance that Sunday, but then again you were neutral and it has to be done sometime. Perhaps Japanese intel had worked out that schedule is there any evidence of that? But the sailors there did detect the incoming aircraft which they misidentified as an incoming B17 flight that was expected that day. Again you were not at war the alert levels were not what they would have been if you were.
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Post by rmc on Nov 12, 2020 1:20:17 GMT
Yes. America wasn't at war at that point. But since at least May, 1940, there was growing realization that we were about to be. www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/the-debate-behind-us-intervention-in-world-war-ii/277572/From FDR's mood during "fireside chats", to efforts within congress to try and ensure neutrality, our country was aware that the global scene was getting tense. And, military bases were not oases of relaxation and recreation. Though the alert levels were not what they would have been, if at war, they were hardly relaxed.
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Post by mrfatso on Nov 12, 2020 7:09:17 GMT
Yes. America wasn't at war at that point. But since at least May, 1940, there was growing realization that we were about to be. www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/the-debate-behind-us-intervention-in-world-war-ii/277572/From FDR's mood during "fireside chats", to efforts within congress to try and ensure neutrality, our country was aware that the global scene was getting tense. And, military bases were not oases of relaxation and recreation. Though the alert levels were not what they would have been, if at war, they were hardly relaxed. Yes but the level of alert when at peace even an uneasy one is still a notch or two down from, we are actually at war. The fact you were relaxed is shown by the church parades you had at the time, in war you would not have had everyone at a service at the same time, you do it in smaller batches,
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Post by rmc on Nov 12, 2020 13:03:30 GMT
Yes. America wasn't at war at that point. But since at least May, 1940, there was growing realization that we were about to be. www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/the-debate-behind-us-intervention-in-world-war-ii/277572/From FDR's mood during "fireside chats", to efforts within congress to try and ensure neutrality, our country was aware that the global scene was getting tense. And, military bases were not oases of relaxation and recreation. Though the alert levels were not what they would have been, if at war, they were hardly relaxed. Yes but the level of alert when at peace even an uneasy one is still a notch or two down from, we are actually at war. The fact you were relaxed is shown by the church parades you had at the time, in war you would not have had everyone at a service at the same time, you do it in smaller batches, It is certainly all true with respect to the general condition of the military at the time. But, my speculations are directed toward a tiny corner of the nation & military then: the war department at Washington D.C. and not the general nation as a whole. Let's see what President Biden does with the Kimmel situation. It's mostly covered in that video I posted a few texts back. Did you see it? Like I say, peace time activity and war time activity are easy to sum up by alert levels. And, you'd be absolutely correct. But, in certain areas and for certain key individuals the behavior can be strikingly different. That's what my speculative notions are about: a key individual who chooses not to send along important intelligence during, what is for him, mounting war potential. For example, with respect to how different alert levels can be for individuals, drawing on my own military experience during peace time (1980s), I attended military training for Pararescue, U.S. Army Airborne, and Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (renamed Long Range Surveillance Detachment). Anyway, it was the height of peace during the early 1980s, having only operation Urgent Fury to call as anything close to war time. But, within the my scope of experience and mindset, everything was hyper intense, basically All Of The Time! Meanwhile, 2007, when I enlisted again for an actual war,(Iraqi Surge), due to the fact the training was different (Combat Medic 68W), we had moments where things seemed pretty lax. In fact on a few occasions our whole 500 man unit was loaded on buses and delivered to the AT&T Stadium in San Antonio to watch a Spurs basketball game or two... even with beer!? Unheard of, lol. Don't get me wrong here. We were a combat unit, so training did get on with things when it was supposed to. But we were not Special Ops, or anything close to "NORAD" or any other high level command center. 1940 command centers throughout the nation were on board with FDR's concerns. There, things were getting involved.
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Post by mrfatso on Nov 12, 2020 17:13:51 GMT
With respect the 1980s were not exactly peac time, it wasn’t a hot war but it was the Cold War, alert levels were never as relaxed as full peace time levels. Here in the U.K. the idea we would only have 4 minutes warning before receiving a bucket of instant sunshine was a little wearing.
In 2007 except for a random terror attack by a lone person the danger to US personnel was pretty low.
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Post by ironhold on Nov 12, 2020 17:40:57 GMT
There was no reason to think the IJN was going to attack Pearl when it left port, it could have been manoeuvres, they could have been going elsewhere like Vladivostok 941km from Japan with a hard pressed USSR looking like it might fall to Germany, or Hong Kong that the British would have difficulty defending. And how many times had they left port for manoeuvres, did America jump every time that happened. The radar was due to be switched off I would guess for maintenance that Sunday, but then again you were neutral and it has to be done sometime. Perhaps Japanese intel had worked out that schedule is there any evidence of that? But the sailors there did detect the incoming aircraft which they misidentified as an incoming B17 flight that was expected that day. Again you were not at war the alert levels were not what they would have been if you were. There have been incidents where civilian airports turned off some or all of their radar or other sensors as a means of dealing with false alarms. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linate_Airport_disasterIn the Linate Airport Disaster, for example, a passenger plane collided with a taxiing business jet in a thick fog because officials at the airport had disengaged a key warning system due to local wildlife constantly setting it off. Without the warning system in place, the fog kept the air traffic controllers from knowing who was where.
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Post by rmc on Nov 12, 2020 17:43:49 GMT
Oh, I know. Trying to use my personal experience is going to cloud things a bit. Just an attempt to show that attitudes can vary within a given alert level. But, furthermore, the period after world war one was one where civilians tried to forget about world wars, and one where old soldiers who now found themselves in a higher degree of military power tried to remind people the importance of keeping things in perspective. Being the "old warhorse" who refused to let go his world warring ways created interesting differences in opinion. By twenty or so years since the last world war, from a 1940 point of view, some of those military commanders were quite alarmed, tensing up at the prevailing "Neville Chamberlain" attitude that seemed to continue and permeated much of the hill. EDIT: And, just to be clear (again, using my specific experiences), my training as both a Cold War soldier, and as a Post 911 Soldier states that the Cold War was mostly a potential ground war in Europe from the LRSD point of view. Meaning we were in less danger while here in the states with respect to our specific mission (there is the prospect of thermonuclear war, of course. But that wasn't our mission). And, generally the cold war was far more intense during the 1960s or 1970s than 1980s. Meanwhile, since the 911 attack happened directly on U.S. soil, the prospect of danger, here in country, was actually considered higher during 2007, than, say 1983. Fort Hood isn't extremely far away from Fort Sam Houston. en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Fort_Hood_shooting
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