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Post by the light works on Nov 24, 2020 15:16:24 GMT
Right. Rigidity toward orders... ... such that it puts the attackers at odds with the very focus of their goal : oil. Why no *orders* to destroy the American oil in the first place?!! The need to obtain oil for Japan was the overriding focus, the mission to cripple the American pacific fleet would help obtain that goal, and, as Cyber has neatly pointed out, the ease of destroying the American Pacific fleet oil reserves while buzzing around Pearl would make a certain amount of sense and would likely be a component of such an attack. Meanwhile, allowing an attack upon a base like Pearl makes a certain amount of sense if attacks on the Atlantic fleet did nothing to sway public opinion thus far. After all the combined weight of attacks on both ends of the country should be enough to finally engage and enrage the American public and a Congress which chooses to write grandiose acts of neutrality. However, as Cyber says, inviting an attack at all on Pearl puts in peril the American oil.So, in the end it makes zero sense to do that. However, it makes zero sense as well for the Japanese not to *order* the destruction of the American oil while they are there, rigidity to orders not withstanding. Things make "no sense" all around. FDR likely saw any advance upon Pearl Harbor by the Japanese as being less successful than the continued German advances in the Atlantic thus far. He, and anyone really, would give the Germans more credit over the Japanese at the time. Since the German show did not impress the American public, neither would a Japanese... unless such shows were coupled together as attacks on both ends of the country. So, allow a Japanese assault if they come, if they manage. you are trying to apply imagination to an action that came about through limited imagination. Yamamoto had imagination. he came up with the idea of doing a carrier based torpedo/bomb attack on the US fleet. at the time they thought that by destroying the fleet, they would take the US out of their way. so when they gave orders to the task force, they told them to destroy the ships in order of importance given to them, and prevent planes from launching. the fleet commander (I made a quick try to look up his name, but didn't put any real effort into it) I remember from previous posts didn't have much imagination, so he gave specific orders to the pilots that they were to concentrate most on battleships and destroyers, then aircraft carriers, then support vessels, with some planes strafing the airfield to destroy defensive planes on the ground. so the plots followed orders. meanwhile, Roosevelt and the rest of the washington brass had a failure of imagination. they expected Japan to strike the east indies or the philippines, so they concentrated the fleet in pearl harbor where it would be safe; because the radar would pick up Japanese battleships before they got into gun range, and the harbor was too shallow for torpedoes. and besides, Japan wouldn't attack without declaring war. (which they didn't - but the declaration got delayed in transit) |
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Post by rmc on Nov 24, 2020 15:59:09 GMT
I'm sorry that it takes an unprecedented amount of "imagination" for them to stay on point with their ultimate concern.
Furthermore...
The Japanese carrier fleet, made its journey to the islands of Hawaii through waters which the U.S. had pronounced “vacant.”
The ocean was declared closed when war became “imminent,” explained Rear Adm. Richmond K. Turner, head of the War Plans Division of the U.S. Navy.
The U.S. diverted traffic south “so that the track of the Japanese task force would be clear.”
When Adm. Husband E. Kimmel put to sea two weeks before December 7, 1941, he essentially sailed upon those "vacant" waters, heading up toward the northern islands, (coincidentally the same waters the Japanese would launch aircraft from) such that he was asked to maintain the vacant, empty nature of a potential Japanese track, and ordered to return to Pearl.
So, there is that.
If American was "only focused on East Indonesia" why all the work to provide "a clear track" all the way in to the Hawaian islands? Why can't Kimmel play with his boats near Hawaii since that's supposedly so far away from "the real concern : Philippines"??
Another to openly welcome the prospect of Japanese attack in the prewar weeks was U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, before offering a postwar amendment that “of course, no one anticipated that this act would be the crippling of the Pacific fleet.” “We apologize for the Pearl Harbor attack being outside the bounds of that which was desired,” he said!
The Japanese might therefore proclaim. “But what, pray tell, was the attack you had in mind?”
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Post by the light works on Nov 24, 2020 16:29:06 GMT
The Japanese carrier fleet, made its journey to the islands of Hawaii through waters which the U.S. had pronounced “vacant.” The ocean was declared closed when war became “imminent,” explained Rear Adm. Richmond K. Turner, head of the War Plans Division of the U.S. Navy. The U.S. diverted traffic south “so that the track of the Japanese task force would be clear.” When Adm. Husband E. Kimmel put to sea two weeks before December 7, 1941, he essentially sailed upon those "vacant" waters, heading up toward the northern islands, (coincidentally the same waters the Japanese would launch aircraft from) such that he was asked to maintain the vacant, empty nature of a potential Japanese track, and ordered to return to Pearl. So, there is that. If American was "only focused on East Indonesia" why all the work to provide "a clear track" all the way in to the Hawaian islands? Why can't Kimmel play with his boats near Hawaii since that's supposedly so far away from "the real concern : Philippines"?? Another to openly welcome the prospect of Japanese attack in the prewar weeks was U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, before offering a postwar amendment that “of course, no one anticipated that this act would be the crippling of the Pacific fleet.” “We apologize for the Pearl Harbor attack being outside the bounds of that which was desired,” he said! The Japanese might therefore proclaim. “But what, pray tell, was the attack you had in mind?” because with no other ships in that area, they would know any radar contact was a japanese warship. you are still applying hindsight and 21st century thinking to a war in the first half of the 20th century. |
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Post by rmc on Nov 24, 2020 16:30:58 GMT
And you are using hindsight to declare what you declare too with all of your, "this makes no sense and that makes no sense". As if the players at hand have to play by your 21st century sensibilities.
There are things that were said that tell exactly what the mission was.. from THEIR 20th century point of view - no hindsight from me needed.
So, you're going to just blast right by Marshall's flagrant open admission as if he never said, sorry we didn't think that the attack we wanted could mean that they could hit us that hard (above)?
Figures.
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Post by the light works on Nov 24, 2020 16:58:46 GMT
And you are using hindsight to declare what you declare too with all of your, "this makes no sense and that makes no sense". As if the players at hand have to play by your 21st century sensibilities. There are things that were said that tell exactly what the mission was.. from THEIR 20th century point of view - no hindsight from me needed. So, you're going to just blast right by Marshall's flagrant open admission as if he never said, sorry we didn't think that the attack we wanted could mean that they could hit us that hard (above)? Figures. yes, I am applying my 21st century sensibilities to interpret his "no-one anticipated this act to be the crippling of the pacific fleet" to mean that no-one expected a japanese sneak attack on pearl harbor that crippled the pacific fleet. |
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Post by Cybermortis on Nov 24, 2020 17:25:24 GMT
Keeping the seas clear was about shifting merchant shipping away from areas where submarine activity was likely to be high. Remember that even though the USA wasn't (directly) involved in the war at the time they were well aware of the risks submarines posed to shipping. All they had to do was look East to what was happening in the North Atlantic.
This was much the same as the implementation of the Convoy system in the Atlantic in 1939, although the US was a bit more proactive in starting measures to protect shipping. Most likely having noted some of the early problems the British and French had early on while the convoy system was put into effect.
Basically you have to assume that your opponent is going to have ships and submarines at sea before they declare war. And you will end up loosing shipping to those forces while you try to put protective measures in place as a result.
It also makes life a lot easier when it comes to looking for hostile ships if you can remove merchant ships from an area; In 1940 the German Navy lost two brand new destroyers to a single He-111 due to the ship crews failing to identify the aircraft as friendly, and the bomber on the He-111 being unable to tell the difference between a Destroyer and a large merchant ship. (The US was probably not aware of this event. But was probably aware of the difficulty of identifying ships from high flying aircraft, especially with green personal).
It also deprives the enemy of potential reconnaissance assets; one of the problems the British and German's had in the North Sea was the 'fishing boats' in the area that may or may not happen to be fitted with radio equipment to let your opponent's know where your ships are.
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Post by the light works on Nov 24, 2020 17:46:39 GMT
Keeping the seas clear was about shifting merchant shipping away from areas where submarine activity was likely to be high. Remember that even though the USA wasn't (directly) involved in the war at the time they were well aware of the risks submarines posed to shipping. All they had to do was look East to what was happening in the North Atlantic. This was much the same as the implementation of the Convoy system in the Atlantic in 1939, although the US was a bit more proactive in starting measures to protect shipping. Most likely having noted some of the early problems the British and French had early on while the convoy system was put into effect. Basically you have to assume that your opponent is going to have ships and submarines at sea before they declare war. And you will end up loosing shipping to those forces while you try to put protective measures in place as a result. It also makes life a lot easier when it comes to looking for hostile ships if you can remove merchant ships from an area; In 1940 the German Navy lost two brand new destroyers to a single He-111 due to the ship crews failing to identify the aircraft as friendly, and the bomber on the He-111 being unable to tell the difference between a Destroyer and a large merchant ship. (The US was probably not aware of this event. But was probably aware of the difficulty of identifying ships from high flying aircraft, especially with green personal). It also deprives the enemy of potential reconnaissance assets; one of the problems the British and German's had in the North Sea was the 'fishing boats' in the area that may or may not happen to be fitted with radio equipment to let your opponent's know where your ships are. and of course, at least the west coast of the US is well aware of the "russian trawlers" had a work colleague tell me a story of a coastie station boss giving him a demonstration that their hydrophones were sufficiently sensitive to recognize the sound of a cutter starting its engines. of course, that is now. not then. |
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Post by rmc on Nov 24, 2020 20:15:59 GMT
And you are using hindsight to declare what you declare too with all of your, "this makes no sense and that makes no sense". As if the players at hand have to play by your 21st century sensibilities. There are things that were said that tell exactly what the mission was.. from THEIR 20th century point of view - no hindsight from me needed. So, you're going to just blast right by Marshall's flagrant open admission as if he never said, sorry we didn't think that the attack we wanted could mean that they could hit us that hard (above)? Figures. yes, I am applying my 21st century sensibilities to interpret his "no-one anticipated this act to be the crippling of the pacific fleet" to mean that no-one expected a japanese sneak attack on pearl harbor that crippled the pacific fleet. Uh, that isn't the alarming part of his quote that I referenced... this is : "We apologize for the Pearl Harbor attack being outside the bounds of that which was desired,” Marshall said. |
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Post by the light works on Nov 24, 2020 20:25:49 GMT
yes, I am applying my 21st century sensibilities to interpret his "no-one anticipated this act to be the crippling of the pacific fleet" to mean that no-one expected a japanese sneak attack on pearl harbor that crippled the pacific fleet. Uh, that isn't the alarming part of his quote that I referenced... this is : "We apologize for the Pearl Harbor attack being outside the bounds of that which was desired,” Marshall said. oh, right. okay, I'll ignore that he also said they didn't think it would happen at pearl harbor or devastate the fleet. |
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Post by rmc on Nov 24, 2020 21:13:14 GMT
Keeping the seas clear was about shifting merchant shipping away from areas where submarine activity was likely to be high. Rear Adm. Richard K. Turner said they shifted traffic south to keep the track of the Japanese task force clear. Is that clear as in "okay for the go ahead.. you are cleared for take off" or clear as in "there will be no obstacles." Or, clear as in "easily understood"? It's almost problematic for the "it was a surprise" crowd no matter how you slice it. "..the track of the Japanese..." sounds like either being able to pick up on their trail when possible, or continue to monitor what they already had. At any rate, a vacant ocean would mean many things to many people. I can't see that it's entirely specific to submarines and merchant ships. ... Is there any way one of you could cut and paste the letter from George C. Marshall to Dewey into this thread? It's a pdf and my cell phone just ain't up for it. It's looks to be a simple enough Google. It's the Top Secret letter to Dewey where Marshall describes how they've had the codes on the Japanese years before 1944, and were getting things before December 7th, 1941 and had been monitoring their moves. (but declares they did not get info on the attack) Good for both of our positions, it looks like, actually. Thanks. |
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Post by the light works on Nov 24, 2020 22:32:18 GMT
Keeping the seas clear was about shifting merchant shipping away from areas where submarine activity was likely to be high. Rear Adm. Richard K. Turner said they shifted traffic south to keep the track of the Japanese task force clear. Is that clear as in "okay for the go ahead.. you are cleared for take off" or clear as in "there will be no obstacles." Or, clear as in "easily understood"? It's almost problematic for the "it was a surprise" crowd no matter how you slice it. "..the track of the Japanese..." sounds like either being able to pick up on their trail when possible, or continue to monitor what they already had. At any rate, a vacant ocean would mean many things to many people. I can't see that it's entirely specific to submarines and merchant ships. ... Is there any way one of you could cut and paste the letter from George C. Marshall to Dewey into this thread? It's a pdf and my cell phone just ain't up for it. It's looks to be a simple enough Google. It's the Top Secret letter to Dewey where Marshall describes how they've had the codes on the Japanese years before 1944, and were getting things before December 7th, 1941 and had been monitoring their moves. (but declares they did not get info on the attack) Good for both of our positions, it looks like, actually. Thanks. I can answer the second: as of when it would have been useful at pearl harbor, the US was able to intercept and decode japanese diplomatic traffic and low level military traffic. they were about 1% of the way towards being able to decode high security military traffic. what this means in real world terms was that the intelligence office figured out Japan was planning to break off diplomacy about 10 minutes before the diplomats got the message to Washington that they were breaking off diplomacy - which was a significant time AFTER they were supposed to deliver the message; being after the attack took place. the messages intercepted before the pearl harbor attack which would have tipped off the country were finally decoded about a year later. |
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Post by rmc on Nov 25, 2020 12:57:20 GMT
I sure want to thank you, Cyber, everyone else for indulging this topic with me.
It has been a debate that I think was handled very well for what it was!
And, I certainly hope you are correct in your position. The last 100 years has resulted with the U.S. becoming a kind of empire almost (not in countries colonized, but more a general influence over the world I suppose). My concern is that at least some of it has been by, well design.
Sorry I've turned out to be a bit of what some term "conspiracy theorists" (putting it nicely).
I understand that I might be wrong.
After all, I wasn't there for any of these events. If my "Spidey senses" are triggered, I'll just have to do the same as the rest of us and move on.
Anyway, a true conspiracy theory is one where you purely seek to vilify, or at least that's what I think. I'm trying to find all the truth behind where America got her power. I can see that might seem the same thing, but in this country it isn't. Heck, it's almost our civic duty.
Thanks again!! (I hope it's been informative)
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