Pearl Harbor was allowed so as to break US isolationism?

if your stance is that Roosevelt decided to wait until after Japan made the first move to declare war, that's not a conspiracy theory, that's public record.

The video link is now way back in the middle of this thread somewhere, and I could link it again up here if that helps at all, but apparently the family of Kimmel have been in and out with Biden over this since he was a Senator, and then Vice President, etc. He's supposed to be into helping the family of Kimmel, and helping from the point of view that they'd prefer. Could be a point of view that isn't good for Washington of 1941.

Since Biden is now the president, I figure he's in position and power to do whatever it was they set out to do in that video by the family.

Should I dig up that video, or did you happen to see that one already?

At this point I don't want to post anything too much more on the topic unless it is helpful.

Oh! And, just so you all know, I realized this topic is generally thought of as conspiracy theory. And, as a posted myth that would be off limits. I put it in here instead for discussion only because it has come up again and things could be changing a little with regard to that status. (I stress *could*)

Basically, it's getting hard to find things that have been taken for granted that may need another look. If I've stepped into basically off limits territory it is ONLY because Biden *could* end up twisting this a little but out of that territory.

Put it this way: between 1850 and 1950 only school children ever seriously saw the fact that South America lined up fairly nicely with Africa. Before the turn of those two centuries few scientists believed continents could be shoved through the ocean. It may not have been "conspiratorial", however it was seen as complete quackery. But, by 1950 continental drift had taken its place amoung many honored scientific achievements.

Nothing says this topic will ever go through THAT level of transformation, but I figure if Biden has agreed to basically help Husband Kimmel, it may need to have a set of eyes on it... nothing more//

Observationally, it appears each of us learned something in this thread. There's that at least.

I had a strange thought occur to me, so I looked it up and did some quick maths. any of the faster warships of WWII would be within 6 days of Hawaii from anywhere in the pacific. Japan was 5.6 days from Hawaii for one of their fast battleships. our essex class carriers were a bit slower, but it shows how open ended the "japan could attack us in 6 days" statement is.

Keep in mind that the actual travel time is more complex that simply looking at a ships top speed. You also have to look at a ships most efficient speed in order to get the greatest range.

So in theory any of the US Cruisers and Battleships had the range to get from Pearl to the Philippines or Australia on their internal fuel supplies alone. However if you look more closely, and ignoring that even if they did this they wouldn't have the fuel left to actually do anything when they got there. In order to do this the Battleships would need to maintain a constant speed of some 15 knots, the Cruisers about 20 knots. (I'm excluding the Destroyers as they didn't have anything remotely close to the range to get to either place on their internal fuel stores).
So in reality a fleet of Battleships and Cruisers couldn't make such a trip together, without one or the other running out of fuel long before they got close to either destination; And without having to, say, deal with being attacked.

The Japanese fleet that attacked Pearl Harbour included no less than eight tankers for the twenty warships that took part. (Excluding submarines). Which gives some ideas as to the problems; Not least is that in the case of US Oilers/tankers they could only cruise at 14 knots. Indeed I seem to recall that one of the reasons some were skeptical about an attack on Pearl was because this would require the Japanese fleet to sail close to the limits of their range, if they wanted to be able to return home afterwards.

As the saying goes, 'Professional's talk logistics'. And while the USN had a number of issues in regards its thinking early in the war this particular area was one they actually understood very well. They were hampered by a lack of fleet oilers, which could maintain a speed of 18 knots and as such keep up with a battlefleet. But that was a funding issue, not an administrative one. And this is the rub, coming back to those oil tanks at Pearl.

The USN command were VERY well aware of potential logistical problems, and the vulnerability of the oil tanks at Pearl, in any conflict in the Pacific. This is why they started working on the huge underground fuel tanks several years before the attack took place. FDR also knew more than enough about the Navy to understand this aspect of Naval Warfare; There is no way he could have been unaware of such a massive construction, the reasons WHY it was being built and how far along that construction was. Nor could be unaware of the shortage of tankers the USN had, since they had been asking for more of them for most of the 1930's.
All of which is to say that FDR, and the entirety of the USN command, would have fully understood the implications to operations in the Pacific should the tanks at Pearl been hit; Namely that they would be limited to operations on the West Coast and any support to Australia and the Philippines would end up having to get their by way of the South Atlantic, using British bases to refuel.
So as much as they may have needed Japan to attack them. Allowing them to attack a target where there was a VERY good reason to think that the result could be a crippling of the USN's ability to project its power, even if they didn't lose a single ship, makes no sense at all.

Looking at the Japanese ships that took part in the attack might also help explain why the report of that force being at sea didn't cause too much alarm. In 1941 even the Japanese considered carriers as a support element for the Battleships, using them to weaken an opposing fleet before the big guns sailed in and blew everything out of the water in a glorious surface action.
The fleet that Japan sent to attack Pearl couldn't have done that. Indeed given that it would be operating at the edge of its practical range had the US been able to get its fleet at Pearl to sea to engage them in a surface action things would not have gone well for the Japanese. They could not have declined an engagement without increasing their speed, and thus risking running out of fuel before getting close to Japan and potentially losing the ships. Or without having to leave some of their ships, which couldn't have outrun even the older US ships, behind to be sunk; which would include their oilers. Had they opted for a surface action...well they would be badly outnumbered and been on the receiving end of multiple torpedo attacks from the US Destroyers and Cruisers.

Oh, I agree with you Cyber. It makes no sense to burn the house down.

You, I, and I'd certainly hope everyone in 1940 or 41 were looking at it from that perspective. That perspective is inline with what a Naval officer would insist. Heck, anyone would insist leaving the Pacific wide open includes leaving the Pearl and her oil reserves open.

NOT a tactic for good warfare.

However, from a quasi CIA point of view, a purely political point of view, from a man who say "loved the navy" or at least loved using said navy, it becomes a different matter. Especially, the way it ended up.

You are correct though. It is lunacy to ask the Japanese to hail a boat, float it by and destroy the Jewel of the Pacific.

No one would ever believe someone went and did that.

Perfect.

Granted:

Desiring an attack of some sort from the Japanese against U.S. interests somewhere in the Pacific does not require a devastating attack upon two years worth of oil reserves located in Pearl Harbor.

To specifically desire exactly that makes zero sense, as you say.

But here is another thing that, when you look closely at it, also makes zero sense.

The Japanese were zeroing in on a mounting problem for them: the embargo which cut off their oil. The Japanese were laser focused on getting oil, realized how incredibly important oil was for any ships committed to battle, and needed to ensure that U.S.A. was out of commission with respect to its Pacific fleet.

So what doesn't make sense?

Coming 4,000 miles in a war all about oil, wanting to cripple the U.S. fleet, but, at the last minute changing its mind for that last final assault which would have destroyed said oil reserves (after two assaults went flawlessly, no worry about a counter attack by that point) where said reserves, in a war predicated on oil, had to be the real target. So, why not knock it out? They were there. Nobody was stopping them. The Japanese very much realized how important oil was. Are we to believe the story that at that point they were like, "Eh, forget that. We came all this way. Are right here on top of the oil reserves, but, hey! We got like 5 boats. We're good. Let's pack up and move 4,000 miles back away, leaving the U.S. with its entire load of precious oil."

That too makes zero sense.

But, here's the thing. ..




It happened.

Roosevelt didn't WANT Japan to attack. he wanted them to move back out of china and stop trying to take over the pacific. but he knew it was pretty likely they'd attack rather than backing down. so he had the pacific fleet rebased to where it would be a relatively short trip to wherever they attacked, which he thought would be the west indies; because of the oilfields there.

I assume you meant 'East Indies'.



As I'm understanding the orders and plan, the primary targets were the ships in harbour and the airfields. The training for the attack and culture of unquestionably obeying orders did not permit any variation of this plan by the pilots. The Japanese did seem to understand that the oil tanks were vulnerable, as there were calls for a third strike to target those reserves. But that clearly wasn't part of the original plan; If I had to guess this was a mixture of expecting a much tougher defense and wanting to prevent any chance of the forces from sailing forth to try and engage the Japanese fleet. As noted they were close to the limits of their range and badly outnumbered had it come to a surface action. You would, after all, have to assume that the ships at Pearl were all fully fueled.
If the Japanese culture had been a little more relaxed, with more room for diverging from strict battle plans, it is likely that some pilots might have been tempted to strafe the tanks on the way out. But as it was that would have been against the listed targets, and ironically the pilots would probably have been punished for going 'off script'.

Looked at in a certain way, you might say that the Japanese got trapped into thinking purely in tactical terms. Failing to look at the much bigger strategic and logistical picture. While the US got trapped into thinking too much at the strategic and political level and not enough at the tactical issues should an attack come.
So both failed; The Japanese should have been able to cripple the USN for over a year by hitting the fuel tanks. The USN should, in turn, have been able to inflict far heavier losses to the Japanese force while taking far fewer themselves. Weakening the Imperial fleet for much the same amount of time.

I blame COVIDfog